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Abstract The study of intergenerational mobility and most population research are
governed by a two-generation (parent-to-offspring) view of intergenerational
influence, to the neglect of the effects of grandparents and other ancestors and
nonresident contemporary kin. While appropriate for some populations in some
periods, this perspective may omit important sources of intergenerational continuity
of family-based social inequality. Social institutions, which transcend individual
lives, help support multigenerational influence, particularly at the extreme top and
bottom of the social hierarchy, but to some extent in the middle as well.
Multigenerational influence also works through demographic processes because
families influence subsequent generations through differential fertility and survival,
migration, and marriage patterns, as well as through direct transmission of
socioeconomic rewards, statuses, and positions. Future research should attend more
closely to multigenerational effects; to the tandem nature of demographic and
socioeconomic reproduction; and to data, measures, and models that transcend
coresident nuclear families.
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Introduction
Much demographic research focuses on the behavior of individuals, including their
fertility, sex practices, health, migration, intergenerational exchanges, socialization of
children, contact with kin or other networks, residential mobility, and educational and
economic decisions and accomplishments. Yet it is ultimately our job to understand the
implications of these studies for population renewal and change. A concern with how
populations work, not just with representativeness of individual-level observations in
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e-mail: mare@ucla.edupopulations, is the distinguishing feature of population science. I am concerned with
the type of demography that deals fundamentally with the interdependence of
population change and the kinds of causes and effects that are the bread and butter
of empirical population studies. I focus on the problem of the generations in
demography—specifically, intergenerational processes and how our field should
study them. My broadest theme is that in our portfolio of research, we may have
overemphasized a concern with direct relations between parents and children in
micro-level studies of family behavior. Conversely, we have underemphasized a
concern with the influence of more remote kin and the role that parent-child
relations, in general, play in the transformation of populations. I suggest that we
should attend more closely to (1) the social connections more distant than parent to
child, especially those across three or more generations of kinship; (2) the
multigenerational effects of processes within the nuclear family, even when effects
are transmitted almost solely by nuclear families; (3) not only to the personal
effects of teaching, resource transmission, psychosocial influence between
members of different generations but also to the demography of reproduction:
fertility, mortality, marriage, and migration; and (4) new data and measures that
accommodate multigenerational units of analysis, such as family lineages.
In the first part of this essay, I discuss concepts, such as “multigenerational”
and “inequality;” the competing claims about whether or not there is evidence for
multigenerational effects; and our typical practice of looking at only one or two
generations at a time, especially in the study of intergenerational social mobility.
In the second section, I suggest mechanisms that give rise to multigenerational
effects, focusing mainly on how social institutions, broadly construed, give rise
to multigenerational effects, because they transcend individual lives and
differentially affect the wealthy, the middle class, and the poor. I also touch
upon some biological mechanisms that may lead to a higher level of
multigenerational continuity than our typical two-generation models imply. In
the third section, I describe the interdependence of inter- and multigenerational
effects with population renewal, and present examples of research that shows the
fruits of taking a multigenerational perspective.
Why Study Multigenerational Effects?
This essay might be construed as a plea to study the demography of dynasties, that
is, populations of family-based units that persist over many generations. However, I
avoid the term dynasty, largely because human mating patterns make the existence
and identification of distinct dynasties demographically impossible in all but the
most inbred of island communities or in kinship schemes that accord unequivocal
primacy to one sex or the other (e.g., Bernheim and Bagwell 1988). Thus, I use
terms like “inheritance,”“ multigenerational,” and “lineage.” I am indeed interested
in the possibility of social influence across more than two generations and the
existence of gradually changing yet persistent family entities, but I leave imprecise
the degree of interdependence among these multigenerational entities, which is likely
to vary across populations with varying rules about marriage and other lateral social
ties. For the purposes of this essay, I regard a family as a group of individuals who
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The content of family life, including norms and practices of intrafamilial obligation,
understandings of who is or is not a family member, and the emotional connections
among kin, may vary considerably between and within populations.
That nuclear family–based research can be culture-bound and present-bound is
hardly a new point. It underpins anthropological and sociological approaches that
treat kin ties as problematic and mysterious rather than given. Rather than analyzing
processes within a fixed set of family relations, these types of research ask where
and when different forms of kin-related behavior arise. Similarly, research on
economic development and ethnographic research on many topics address the
complex social relationships within and between households and across multiple
generations. But most of our core research, especially work focused on developed
societies, is rooted in a paradigm of parent-to-child or parent-to–adult offspring
connections. This is a typical assumption in one of my own research areas,
intergenerational mobility—especially educational, occupational, and income
mobility (see, e.g., Mare 1981)—but it pervades our field. We study parent-child
interactions and bequests and other transfers from elderly parents to adult offspring.
We study the effects of family background and social class on all manner of
“outcomes” in our work. We may do this for good reasons, although we may also do
it just because it is expedient. Either way, I suggest that we should attend to a
broader set of connections.
The reasonableness of a call for more attention to the effects of grandparents and
other more remote ties notwithstanding, some careful skeptics have already
investigated the presumed effects of grandparents and other ancestors on children
net of the effects of parents and found these effects weak or nonexistent. For
example, Cherlin and Furstenberg (1992), in their landmark study of grandparents,
concluded that grandparents are valued kin, but their influence on grandchildren
beyond what the parents can do is usually limited. Warren and Hauser (1997)
showed, in their analysis of three generations of families in the Wisconsin
Longitudinal Study, that occupational status is transmitted from parent to child
without net assistance from grandparents.
Despite these null findings, however, we should still give further consideration to
multigenerational effects. The conclusions of these studies may not be invariant
across time and place; that is, they may depend on the particular institutional
arrangements, samples, or populations on which they are based. In later sections of
this essay, I review studies in a variety of contexts that provide highly suggestive
evidence for grandparent effects. But even if nuclear families are the only key agents
of influence and their effects are strong, they may persist beyond one generation. For
example, if parents’ wealth strongly influences offspring’s wealth, then the fortunes
of a family in one generation propagate several generations down the road. The turn
of our field toward careful specification of causal relations, the use of experiments,
random assignments of roommates, “natural” instruments, or other devices to rule
out spurious associations as an explanation for apparent effects should also address
longer-term impacts across generations. We may know how to change the lives of
individuals, but can we change families, lineages, or entire populations?
The impact of one generation on the next is not as straightforward as the simply
estimated “effect” of parents on offspring. Even in a Markovian world, in which
A Multigenerational View of Inequality 3individuals affect their children but not their grandchildren, above and beyond their
indirect influence through the characteristics and behavior of their own children, we
should not just multiply intergenerational correlations or elasticities together to
estimate the multigenerational impact (though that is a rough and ready place to
start). Such effects are convoluted with those of reproduction. The demographic
significance of our focus on intergenerational correlation lies in the interdependence
of the effects of one set of individuals on another combined with the births, deaths,
marriages, and geographic mobility of individuals.
A further theme is that the rigorous search for proof of causal links between the
actions or traits of one set of individuals and the actions or traits of other individuals
(e.g., the effects of the behavior or resources of parents on outcomes for children)
needs to be balanced by the multiple concerns of population science. In considering
the effects of families on outcomes for individuals, population research must also
focus on the creation of families. The latter is, of course, an abiding concern of many
family demographers, but it tends to be neglected in studies that treat family
characteristics as exogenous with respect to outcomes for the next generation. This
concern is related to, but distinct from, other key issues that arise when we try to
generalize from samples of individuals to entire populations. One such issue is the
implications of proven causal relations for whole populations in experiments or other
research strategies that approximate randomized studies: can we generalize from the
limited variation in a given study to the full variation observed in whole populations,
or know how a social intervention that succeeds in a demonstration project will play
out if applied to everyone, including people who live side-by-side and potentially
influence one another on a daily basis (see, e.g., Deaton 2009; Moffitt 2003, 2005)?
A second issue is with the implications of average or local effects when treatments
and effects are inherently heterogeneous (Brand and Xie 2010; Smith 1990). In
contrast, my concern is that when we look at the effects of causes, we should not
ignore the causes of effects (e.g., Morgan and Winship 2007). Put differently, rather
than focusing exclusively at the effects of treatments, we need to ask, Under what
conditions do these treatments occur? If many scholars are interested in the effects of
families on children, at least some demographers should ask, Where do these
families come from? But the latter question should not be considered in isolation
from the former. The causes beget the effects, which beget the causes, and so it goes.
But how it goes depends critically on how multiple generations are connected.
Finally, although the link between parent and child at various life stages is
tangible and well worth studying, we should also widen our focus on what to
measure, what to count, and what to be puzzled about. A true multigenerational
perspective requires that we describe more than just individuals, parent-child pairs,
or nuclear families.
Multigenerational Effects and Inequality
Social and economic inequalities are foci of much population research, whether
about the effects of families on life chances; differences in family, fertility, and
marriage; residential segregation; disparities in health and mortality; poverty; or
other topics. Taking a long view of inequality—longer than a single generation and
enriched by an appreciation of demographic processes—there may be more than
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played by intergenerational mobility in loosening or tightening the link between the
socioeconomic positions, rewards, and statuses of one generation and those of the
next. High mobility lessens the sting of being at the wrong end of inequality if the
life chances of one’s offspring are only loosely tied to one’s own. Indeed, high rates
of intergenerational mobility may undermine lineages if family members are not able
to confer their advantages to their decedents. Averaged across generations,
inequalities are smaller when mobility rates are high. Conversely, high rates of
intergenerational persistence amplify the costs and benefits of one’s socioeconomic
position, lead to higher inequalities when averaged across generations, and sustain
family lineages. This is all the more true if intergenerational persistence is further
reinforced by multigenerational effects—if, for example, children receive extra
benefits from having well-positioned grandparents, regardless of where their own
parents stand in social hierarchies. Finally, because fertility, mortality, and migration
are interdependent with socioeconomic position, they may amplify or dampen
whatever gross inequality effects are implied by rates of mobility alone. In short, the
strength of multigenerational effects is inherently an issue of inequality, whether in
money, health, knowledge, or survival chances.
The Two-Generation Paradigm
The staple of research on the intergenerational transmission of inequality is the analysis
of intergenerational correlations or associations or transition rates. The study of
educational, occupational, and income mobility is a venerable subject in sociology, a
subject of lively interest in economics during the past 20 years, and periodically a topic
for historians. Multivariate versions of this work include multiple aspects of family
background, including socioeconomic statuses; family size, structure, and stability; and
multiple outcomes. The outcomes extend to child development, delinquency, health
behavior, and health status, thereby involving other disciplines as well. Longitudinal
extensions of this research document life transitions and trajectories.
A good example of how central this type of work is to population research is
provided by Palloni’s( 2006) PAA Presidential Address, in which he showed how
the socioeconomic position of families affects the health of young children, and how
health in early childhood may, in turn, affect later health and socioeconomic success.
Variants of this approach apply to intergenerational transfers of encouragement,
knowledge, money, time, space, and other assistance. They are a platform for
detailed description. And they are the basis for theories about how parents and
offspring decide about schooling; marriage and divorce; childbearing; work; and
retirement; and, along the way, they save, spend, transfer, and bequeath. In short, for
most of us, this is the familiar social science perspective.
Our basic studies of fertility and mortality likewise tend to focus on only one or
two generations. This is true whether we are conducting micro-level studies of levels
and differentials in vital processes or making macro-level projections and studies of
population dynamics. An occasional interesting paper on grandparent influence on
fertility notwithstanding, our basic understanding of reproduction is that populations
renew through an independent sequence of two-generation relationships. In our
empirical models, each generation of mothers bears children who, in turn, bear
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demography, we project populations by multiplying together Leslie matrices, which
summarize the fertility and mortality rates of each generation (e.g., Keyfitz and
Caswell 2005). Of course, we do recognize that populations are heterogeneous in
fertility and other vital rates. Much of our work is, in fact, about heterogeneity in
vital processes. Microdemographers discover, describe, and explain differences
in fertility and mortality rates; and macrodemographers, following the principle that
heterogeneous populations always grow faster than a homogeneous population with
the average of the heterogeneous rates (e.g., Keyfitz and Caswell 2005), analyze the
implications of this heterogeneity for population dynamics. Our formal Markovian
models of population renewal can be combined with our empirical models of
intergenerational effects. Indeed, those of us who have worked on blending models
of intergenerational transmission with population renewal make liberal use of this
Markovian view of the world (e.g., Mare 1997; Preston and Campbell 1993).
What unites this large body of work is an exclusive focus on one or two
generations at a time: mother and daughter, father and son, sisters and brothers,
husband and wife, elderly and adult offspring. Whether focusing on parent-child
correlation, husband-wife correlations, or sibling correlations, our models and
research questions are concentrated in a tight web of first-order contacts, indeed a
special subset of such contacts defined by close kinship.
The Significance and Sources of Multigenerational Effects
Why should we be concerned about the narrowness of this focus, and why should
we think otherwise? After all, this paradigm has been productive and, along the way,
we have had occasional reassuring empirical demonstrations that a two-generation
rather than a multigenerational view of intergenerational mobility will suffice. In
addition to the multigenerational studies that have yielded negative effects to which I
have already referred, one can go back to Hodge’s( 1966:33) conclusion that
Although neither type of mobility [inter- or intragenerational] can be fully
described with Markov process, the observed similarity to such a process is
indicative of the high degree of discontinuity which characterizes both the
careers of individuals over their working lives and the social position of
families over several generations.
This is an important claim about how societies and populations work. It implies
that hierarchies of families are relatively transitory. Whereas inequalities among
social positions and the rewards associated with them may persist, the families
whose members occupy these positions and receive the associated rewards are
shuffled substantially from one generation to next. Not only are rates of
intergenerational mobility relatively high, but also families are unable to extend
their influence by more than a single generation. In two-generation approaches to
family influence, parents directly affect their offspring, just as they themselves have
been affected by their own parents. When it comes to thinking about longer-run
change, following the Hodge conclusion, we think in terms of simple causal chains.
That is, grandparents do not directly affect their grandchildren. Rather, the influence
of generation t on generation t + 2 is only indirect, via generation t + 1. The
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ancestry more generally). In a three-generation model, the characteristics of
generation t and t + 1 affect the characteristics of generation t + 2. More generally,
we can consider potential effects of the characteristics of generation t on those of any
subsequent generation t + k. In principle, whether a two-generational or a
multigenerational view of mobility and inequality is closer to the truth should, in
considering any particular population, be a matter of empirical investigation.
Markovian and Non-Markovian Inheritance
A highlevel ofcontinuityfromone generationtothenextinthe livesoffamiliesmay be
consistent with either a Markovian or non-Markovian view of the world. In thinking
about families of great wealth that appear to persist from one generation to the next, we
should distinguish between two possibilities: (1) a high correlation between the wealth
of parents and the (eventual) wealth of their children, yet a pattern of correlations across
several generations that is nonetheless consistent with Markovian persistence (i.e., with
the net irrelevance of grandparent wealth for grandchild wealth); or (2) a high set of
correlations among the wealth of several generations that is formally inconsistent with
simple Markovian inheritance and that imply effects across several generations. If by
multigenerationaleffectswemeanalonger-runsetofintergenerationalconnections than
just a string of tight parent-to-child connections, then the bar is higher for establishing a
conceptual basis for multigenerational effects and for empirical demonstration of their
existence. For most of my discussion, I focus on families connected by more than a
string of two-generation correlations, however strong they may be. Yet multigenera-
tional and Markovian continuity of families may be hard to distinguish. In a world of
absolutely perfect status inheritance—for example, a pure caste system—parents,
grandparents, and earlier ancestors are, for the purpose of analysis, identical in their
social and economic positions. The perfect correlations between each generation make
alternative types of intergenerational effects indistinguishable. In most real populations,
however,intergenerationalassociationsarefarfromperfect,anditbecomesanempirical
matter whether remote ancestors have an independent effect on one’ss o c i a lp o s i t i o nn e t
of the effects of one’s parents. Further, whether multigenerational effects are present
may not be an all-or-nothing matter. An interesting case is one in which status
inheritanceisnearlyperfectatthe verytoporverybottomofa hierarchy.Here,theusual
models of two-generation association may apply to families in the middle of the
socioeconomic distribution,butatthe extremes,anindividual’s fortunesmaydependon
theactionsandexperiencesofamoredistantancestorwhowasluckyorunluckyenough
to achieve great wealth or abject poverty.
Mechanisms of Multigenerational Influence
Institutions and Intergenerational Persistence of Durable and Perishable Wealth
If we consider non-Markovian patterns of inheritance, we must ask, Where do
lagged effects come from? A broad class of mechanisms that may give rise to these
effects is the social institutions that sustain them. To understand how individuals
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how institutions contribute to these effects. Institutions, which are formal or informal
social arrangements that persist over time, are supported by demography, geography,
power, and cultural legitimacy. Because children and their parents typically keep in
touch with each other and studying parent-child pairs is relatively easy, social
scientists tend to maintain a two-generation view of the world. But institutions have
a key feature: in general, they outlive individuals. The maintenance of institutions
and their enduring impacts on families and individuals may be an important source
of multigenerational effects. Family institutions themselves are the obvious ones. If
roles are prescribed for grandparents, this is by definition an institutional mechanism
that may provide grandparent support. But a broader set of institutions encompasses
the law, family, work, education, and finance. Importantly, the institutions that
govern multigenerational effects vary across social hierarchies.
Social scientists talk with varying degrees of rigor about different forms of
capital: for example, physical, financial, human, social, and occupational. It is useful
to think about some of these forms of capital in terms of their perishability. That is,
once they exist, how long do they keep? A key potential multigenerational effect
works through great wealth amassed in a single lifetime but passed on from
generation to generation. The accumulation of a stock of physical and financial
capital in one generation takes a family out of the middle-class mode of wealth
accumulation and transmission. For the contemporary middle class, wealth
accumulates in gradual phases of saving within a single lifetime: for buying a
house, for paying for college, and for retirement. Parental wealth at midlife is largely
transformed into the human capital of the next generation—indexed by educational
attainment and used in occupational settings—making possible the next generation’s
turn at wealth accumulation. Human capital and occupational incumbency may keep
well for most of a lifetime, but unless they are transformed into financial capital (a
big obstacle for most members of the paid labor force), they tend to perish thereafter.
On the other hand, physical and financial capital can, if substantial enough,
transcend individual lives.
1
Intergenerational Correlations
In this light, it is easy to understand the history of sociological and economic
research on the intergenerational correlation of various socioeconomic statuses.
Starting in the 1960s, sociologists showed that correlations between the educational
attainments or the occupational attainments of fathers and sons (using various scales
and measures) ranged from about .35 to .40 (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967). Yet the
intergenerational correlations of incomes, measured using the data available at that
time, were much lower, around .15 (e.g., Bielby and Hauser 1977). Stocks of human
1 The perishability of capital may result in part from depreciation—that is, a reduction in value because of
use, age, and obsolescence. But it also results from consumption or investment losses (in the case of
financial capital) and retirement or death (in the case of human and cultural capital). Strictly speaking,
some forms of human capital may “survive” beyond a single life. Specific forms of human capital (e.g.,
the skills of an artisan) may be directly transmitted from parent to offspring. In contemporary societies,
however, where we rely heavily on educational institutions and on-the-job training, most forms of human
and occupational capital tend to perish after the holder of these capacities or entitlements retires or dies.
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relatively durable and can last most of an adult life. By contrast, income flows,
unless exceptionally large, are comparatively highly perishable. However, in the
early 1990s, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992), exploiting longitudinal income
data in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), showed that averages of
sequences of parent and of offspring incomes yield much higher correlations on the
order of .4, about the same as the educational and occupational correlations
discovered 30 years before. Since then, numerous econometric studies, using longer
sequences of parent and offspring incomes in the PSID, as well as more reliable
administrative income data, have pushed estimates of the intergenerational
correlations of incomes ever higher. For example, a widely cited study by Mazumder
(2005), using Social Security earnings data, puts the estimate at around .6. Similar
results show up for other countries. The longer and more reliable the income
sequences we use in such correlational studies, the closer we may approximate the
intergenerational correlation of wealth. Studies of wealth transmission per se are
rarer because of data and conceptual problems. It is beyond this essay to review
these difficulties, but suffice it to say that wealth presents hard issues about
ownership, fungibility, units of analysis, convertibility, and liquidity that go beyond
our difficulties in thinking about and measuring incomes, occupations, or human
capital. These problems notwithstanding, wealth tends to be more unequally
distributed and more highly correlated across generations than the other three
dimensions of inequality that have been studied so extensively.
Upper- Versus Middle-Class Modes of Inheritance: Financial and Human Capital
When it comes to wealth, high intergenerational correlations suggest multigenerational
influence. Physical wealth can deteriorate, and financial wealth can be frittered away,
but both have the potential to last at least several generations. Not only is their shelf life
less constrained by the limits to a human life, but also they can be augmented through
further investment that is not tied to the lives of individuals. Some families are so
wealthy that their fortunes could not be destroyed in several generations even if heirs
were perversely motivated to try. More important, financial wealth in the form of a
family business, farm, or simply a large capital account frees subsequent generations
from relying on the perishable and uncertain forms of wealth provided through
educational and occupational pursuits. It breaks the middle-class cycle that dominates
most families’ lives and, for that matter, most of our research.
Wealth is also sustained by legal and commercial forces. Although “wealth
management” is a service that has concrete meaning for the few, legal arrangements
such as “generation-skipping trusts” are well-institutionalized mechanisms for
assuring that wealthy grandparents will enrich their grandchildren.
Social and residential isolation can also reinforce wealth persistence. Exclusive
neighborhoods, clubs, and social registers are visible trappings of wealth. Despite the
limited importance of educational competition for the very wealthy, elite educational
institutions may consolidate family position across generations. The legacy system
of college admissions, practiced in the nation’s private universities during the first
three-quarters of the twentieth century, was a key mechanism of elite persistence.
Exploring the history of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton during the heyday of the
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schools received from having a father who was an alumnus. In 1951, for example,
rates of admission were 73% for sons of Yale alumni, 79% for Princeton sons, and a
staggering 94% for Harvard sons. By themselves, these data may be consistent with
a two-generation model, although the admission rates for Harvard sons were so high
that later generations owed a specific debt to the ancestor who became the first
Harvard man in his family. But these rates were, in all likelihood, enhanced by
multigenerational effects. Young men whose fathers did not attend one of these
schools but whose grandfathers attended or donated to the university were highly
advantaged in admission. Men whose Ivy League grandfathers had no sons and who
could not have an Ivy League mother in the pre-coeducation era drew legacy
benefits from grandfathers.
The demographic import of Ivy League colleges Harvard, Princeton, and Yale is
limited, both today and in the past. Nonetheless, we should attend to Karabel’s
observations because, among other reasons, the legacy system illustrates an
institutional mechanism of multigenerational influence. He also showed the uneasy
relationship between the direct inheritance of privilege by the wealthy and the
indirect and less certain advantage via the more meritocratic educational pathway for
the middle class. Legacy admission to private colleges was and is a practice that
extends well beyond the Ivy League (e.g., Kahlenberg 2010). And it may be on the
rise in other types of schools as well. For example, some affluent Los Angeles–area
communities have attempted to establish legacy systems in K-12 public schools that
make special provisions for grandchildren of area residents (Mehta 2009), paralleling
similar practices already in place at private schools.
Although I have stressed the importance of wealth inheritance among the very
wealthy, a number of studies document transfers across multiple generations for
families that are not wealthy. For example, Quisumbing (1997) showed that
grandparents in the Philippines pass family wealth directly to grandchildren: land
to grandsons and educational finance to granddaughters. Iglesias and Riboud (1988)
reported strong net effects of grandparent effects on “child quality” in Spain.
Ardington et al. (2010) documented the subtle interdependence of three generations
in South Africa, depending on whether grandchildren have been orphaned by parents
who died of AIDS and the availability and capacity of grandparents who may be
caregivers. Coate et al. (2010) used the PSID to investigate expenditures in extended
families (including, importantly, noncoresiding kin). Extended families do not
behave as a unit, nor do they behave as isolated individuals. Their analysis confirms
that for many families in the United States, grandparents play a big role in their
grandchildren’s schooling options and decisions. And LaFave and Thomas (2010)
demonstrated that decisions about family resource allocation in Indonesia extend
beyond coresident household members, with positive effects of extrahousehold
resources for children’s health.
Needs for and Availability of Kin
Another set of mechanisms through which individuals may be affected by kin
more remote than their parents involves the needs for and the availability of kin,
especially when death, divorce, or migration take parents away or when
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United States, the mid-twentieth century was a unique time for children:
Uhlenberg (2009) showed that, compared with recent cohorts, children born in
earlier eras were somewhat more likely to lose one or both parents as the result of
higher adult mortality. Children born in later eras were much m o r el i k e l yt os u f f e r
the absence of a parent as the result of divorce, separation, and nonmarital fertility.
By themselves, these trends suggest potential socioeconomic needs of children and
single parents during these periods. In the earlier era, children were somewhat less
likely to have living grandparents who could substitute for missing parents. The
trends suggest a greater, albeit highly variable role for whatever extra kin were
available. In the later era, in contrast, grandparents and possibly other older kin are
more likely to be available.
Kin need and kin availability are issues for the entire population, but their effects
may vary by social class. McLanahan (2004) and Uhlenberg (2009), among others,
have emphasized the growing inequality in the availability and quality of potential
kin, owing to shifting differences in fertility, marriage, and assortative mating that
favor more-educated and prosperous families. Disparity in the socioeconomic
standing of grandparents has emerged in recent years, just when children may need
their grandparents the most. The variations in patterns of kin availability and kin
need over the past 100 years in this country and even more so worldwide are strong
evidence that parent-to-child correlations or transactions are too narrow a basis for
the study of intergenerational social mobility, intergenerational effects more
generally, or the population dynamics that may result.
The changing living arrangements and availability of kin for children, while
well-known to demographers, exemplify a general phenomenon that has
important implications for the study of intergenerational mobility. The conclusions we
draw about mobility, whether the amount of mobility, the inheritance of social position,
or the position of people relative to their forebears, depends critically on how we think
aboutthewebofkinwhomakeupone’sfamilybackground.BiblarzandRaftery(1993)
suggested that occupational mobility is greater (inheritance smaller) in single-parent
families and conjectured weaker intergenerational links in the black population
than among whites as a result. Beller (2009)s h o w e dt h a tt r e n de s t i m a t e so f
intergenerational occupational mobility that have focused only on fathers have, by
ignoring the growth in the combined influences of the socioeconomic positions of
fathers and mothers, missed a sharp upswing in intergenerational persistence.
When family position is indexed by both parents, occupational inheritance has, in
fact, increased markedly across recent cohorts. The increased intergenerational
persistence of occupational status reflects both the growing economic importance
of women’s work in the status of families and also secular increases in educational
homogamy (e.g., Schwartz and Mare 2005). These associations are not direct
evidence of a multigenerational effect; they are simply the net associations between
the characteristics of parents and those of their offspring. That mothers have
always been important and have become economically more important is a useful
though familiar point (e.g., Sweeney 2002). But the greater point is the more
general one: our inferences about intergenerational effects depend on which
relationships we consider. Because the quantity and quality of these relationships
depend on evolving demographic patterns, no fixed set of family relationships
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the value of the usual practice of studying intergenerational socioeconomic
mobility by focusing only on a single, predetermined parent-child association.
Social Isolation and the Persistence of Hardship
At the bottom of the socioeconomic distribution are extreme disadvantages for both
individuals and families over more than one generation. Institutionalized subjugation,
such as slavery or serfdom, while in place, ensures intergenerational continuity at the
bottom or even outside of a system of social stratification. But even when such
subjugation is removed, its effects may persist (1) through new institutions of
subjugation, (2) through such deep human and physical capital deprivation that
upward mobility is nearly impossible, or (3) through extreme segregation that
isolates the nominally free from mainstream systems of wealth acquisition and
mobility. In the case of African American slavery and its aftermath, abundant
research has documented each of these mechanisms. Blackmon (2008), for
example, described the regimes of indentured labor combined with corrupt law
enforcement that bound black men to exploitive employers in the period between
the Civil War and World War II. Keister (2000), Avery and Rendall (2002), and
others have documented the massive and persistent wealth disparities between
blacks and whites. A long tradition of demographic research has documented the
extreme spatial isolation of African Americans (e.g., Duncan and Duncan 1957;
Massey and Denton 1993; Taeuber and Taeuber 1965). The latter research suggests
that institutionalized residential isolation has weighed heavily on successive
generations of some of the poorest members of society.
MoredirectevidenceofthelegacyofsocialisolationiscontainedinworkbySharkey
and Elwert (2010) on residential immobility and strong deleterious effects on children
of living in poor neighborhoods. Using the PSID, they isolated the impact of
grandparents’ neighborhood conditions on grandchild outcomes. They showed the
negative impact of the poverty level of the neighborhood where a child’s parents grew
up, controlling for the neighborhood in which the child lives, on black children’s
reading performance. They showed independent effects of both neighborhoods that
combine to an estimated one-half of a standard deviation in reading performance. This
work not only suggests a pathway for multigenerational persistence of disadvantage at
the low end of the socioeconomic distribution but also suggests that we should cast a
wider net in considering multigenerational effects. That is, grand-kin are important,
but “grand-neighborhoods” may be as well.
Cumulative Advantage and Disadvantage
Whereas some of the effects of prior generations are mainly contingent on the
configuration of available kin—that is, whether two parents are available or surrogates
from elsewhere in the family, including grandparents, are called in—other effects are
more systematic and independent of kin availability. Yet even kin availability has a
systematic component to the extent that it reflects long-run trends in fertility, mortality,
marital disruption, women’s work roles, and other patterns. These systematic
mechanisms of persistent effects beyond one’s own family of origin have in common
12 R.D. Marea principle of cumulative advantage or disadvantage—that is, that conditions established
in the remote past have an enduring impact and cumulate rather than equilibrate across
generations. In a two-generation model, families who are unusually well-off in one
generation are likely to “regress” toward the average in the next. Conversely, families
who are unusually poor in one generation are more likely to “bounce back” in the next.
This is, from an egalitarian standpoint, a happy consequence of Markovian inheritance.
But in a multigenerational view, some families may be able to “build on” advantages
they already have and move up further in successive generations; other families may
remain mired in hardship. O’Rand (2002) and DiPrete and Eirich (2006)
formalized the concept of “cumulative advantage” in careers or lifetimes. DiPrete and
Eirich unified Merton’s classic ideas about scientific careers—past performance
signalingfutureproductivity,theroleofchanceevents,andtheMatthew(reputation)
effect—with more recent ideas about superstar markets, gene-environment
interactions, and other mechanisms. Yet whereas these authors are concerned with
the course of individual lives, related ideas and models may, with suitable
modifications, be applied to intergenerational processes as well. Cumulative
advantage can be an intergenerational process if we allow for multigenerational
effects. Institutional mechanisms such as wealth accumulation and transfer, slavery
and indentured employment, legacies in college admissions, kin need and
availability, and segregation may amplify differences between individuals born
into different families. If they do so to a greater extent than would be expected on
the basis of a two-generation model of social mobility, this would imply
intergenerational cumulative advantage.
Non-Markovian Fertility
Our world is even more complicated if we acknowledge the possibilities of
mutigenerational effects on basic demographic processes. How this plays out in its
full complexity is beyond any single population scientist. But we should
acknowledge creative and promising theoretical and empirical work on this subject.
For example, in Israel, Danziger and Neuman (1989) found intergenerational
“inheritance” of fertility along the maternal line (i.e., the greater a woman’s number
of siblings, the higher her fertility), though not along the paternal line. Cox and Stark
(2005) theorized about “demonstration effects”—that is, that grandparents motivate
their children to bear them grandchildren, under whose watchful eyes the middle
generation will be motivated to treat the grandparents well in their old age. Meroni
and Pronzato (2010) exploited the four generations represented in the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe and provided evidence that the
availability of childcare help by potential grandparents raises the fertility of the
middle generation. These types of effects present an extra challenge for
researchers on social mobility and population transformation. Whereas the formal
demography of Markovian population renewal is well worked out, both for
homogeneous populations and populations differentiated by levels of wealth in
which intergenerational mobility occurs, more work needs to be done on the
macrodemographic implications of non-Markovian fertility (and perhaps other
processes), both for homogeneous populations and where social mobility is an
important part of the process.
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Although I have described a number of social institutions that may be implicated in
multigenerational effects, biological mechanisms such as epigenesis may play a role as
well. It is beyond my expertise to review the possible effects of epigenesis, processes
through which environments contribute to inherited modes of gene expression across
multiple generations without modification of DNA. The extent and durability of these
effects in humans is the subject of ongoing debate and research (e.g., Gluckman and
Hanson 2006;J a b l o n k aa n dL a m b2005). A related but distinct set of mechanisms
may arise through grandparent effects on genetic transmission and expression in the
female line. Because a (second-generation) woman’s eggs are created in the weeks
shortly after her conception, the eggs that contain her (third-generation) children’s
maternal genetic material experience almost nine months in their (first-generation)
grandmother’s womb. This allows for intrauterine and, indirectly, broader
environmental influences of grandmothers on their children’s health and development
(Gluckman and Hanson 2005). This biological pathway of multigenerational influence is
well-established, although its import for the kinds of outcomes that are the focus of our
intergenerational mobility research has been the subject of very limited research.
Suggestive evidence in support of the importance of these mechanisms, however, is
provided by recent studies of the combined effects of maternal and grandmaternal
socioeconomic status and health-related behaviors on infant birth weight (Astone et al.
2007; Misra et al. 2005).
Demography and Socioeconomic Reproduction
The problem of multigenerational effects becomes a true demographic issue when
we see how the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status combines
with basic demographic processes to transform populations from one period or
generation to the next. Population research fundamentally rests on knowledge about
differential reproduction, encompassing marriage, fertility, migration, and mortality.
Some dramatic evidence of these processes comes from observations of population
genetics. For example, Zerjal et al. (2003) conjectured that a haplotype on the Y
chromosome, which is highly prevalent in many contemporary Asian populations,
has been carried through a lineage of male descendants of Genghis Kahn. Although
the claim that these are really Genghis Kahn’s genes (as opposed to those of some
other man) is debatable, it does illustrate ambitious multigenerational thinking about
the implications of differential fertility, mortality, marriage, and migration. This
research shows that contemporary populations do not result from a high
intergenerational correlation between the occupations or incomes of families in the
Khan era or by the mechanics of genetic transmission alone. Rather, they result from
population dynamics, subject to mechanisms of selection that include the
accumulation and use of wealth and power combined with superior opportunities
for survival of progeny. Population genetic studies are ambitious and powerful,
whether in the 1,000-year span of the Mongol study, the 30,000-year span of other
studies of the coevolution of genetic and cultural traits (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman 1981), or even in the enticing possibility that high-fertility counterparts to
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reach of these population genetic studies, genetic transmission is, ironically, mainly a
two-generation proposition. Each of us genetically is, save for some possible
epigenetic effects, a function of what was in the reproductive cells of our mothers
and fathers and the environments to which we have been exposed during our
lifetimes. But what we are and where we are socially are a function of history,
intergenerational relations, and differential reproductivity over many generations.
Genes are the endogenous variables in these studies. And the Mongol study offers
strong evidence for multigenerational social effects.
Most social science population researchers are interested in intergenerational
processes based on shorter time spans for people who are more directly observable.
Yet most social mobility research avoids this issue altogether by conditioning on the
distributions of parents’ and offspring’s traits (e.g., income or educational
attainment) and describing these associations. This tradition of work has served
well for answering the narrow question, “Who gets ahead?” (Jencks et al. 1979). But
it is inadequate for analyzing the population question of how a socioeconomic
distribution in one generation gets transformed into a distribution in later
generations. And it is even inadequate for such causal questions as, What would
happen to the next generation if we made it easier for girls (the potential mothers of
the next generation) to stay in school (Mare and Maralani 2006)? The educational
attainment of girls affects whether, when, and whom they marry; how many children
they have and when they will have them; whether they and their families migrate;
and, ultimately, the health and success of their children. But recognizing these
relationships,however, isnot justa matterofspecifyingthe directand indirecteffects of
mothers on children. Rather, it amounts to understanding how the parent-child pairs,
whichformtheheartoftwo-generationresearch,comeabout.Thiscanleadtosurprising
results at the population level when the effects of maternal education and differential
fertility combine. In Indonesia, for example, patterns of intergenerational educational
mobility, assortative mating, and differential fertility imply that the effects of efforts
to raise the educational attainments of women will depend on where in the
educational process such efforts are applied and whether one focuses on effects on
families or on the populations. Because fertility is highest among women with
intermediate levels of schooling, raising the schooling of girls who would otherwise
receive little or no schooling (to at least some elementary or secondary schooling)
raises the average educational attainment of the population: not only will their
children have better environments while growing up, but also the girls will grow up
to have more children. However, raising the schooling of girls who would otherwise
have a high school education (to receive some higher education) will benefit their
families but will have a muted effect overall because these girls will, on average,
bear fewer children. In the latter case, the effects on the education level of families
and populations may differ (Mare and Maralani 2006).
In general, mobility studies should examine the associations between parents and
offspring in a way that takes differential fertility, child and adult mortality,
assortative mating, and migration into account. Such studies can take account of
intergenerational effects of parents’ social position that include not just the capacity
of parents with more resources to confer socioeconomic advantages on their
offspring but also the net reproductive capacity of the parents. Examples of work
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Brazil; Preston and Campbell’s( 1993) study of differential fertility and inheritance
of IQ; and my work with Musick on single-parent families in the United States
(Musick and Mare 2004), with Maralani on women’s education in Indonesia (Mare
and Maralani 2006), and with Choi on women’s education and migration in Mexico
(Choi and Mare 2009). All these studies explicitly or implicitly build on Feeney’s
(1970) and Rogers’ (1975) models of multiregional population projection by
exploiting analogies between geographic and intergenerational mobility.
A corollary of this perspective is that, Markovian or not, intergenerational effects
are inherently multigenerational. Interventions that change the socioeconomic
conditions of families or individuals also change their demographic behavior, that
is, changes in the numbers, longevity, and characteristics of future progeny. I do not
mean to minimize how hard it is to appraise such effects. Policies targeted at girls
may create marriage markets that differ from those produced by policies that change
outcomes for both boys and girls. As we look beyond one generation, our capacity to
project what will happen is made more complicated by the need to take account of
both marriage market dynamics and family effects on children. But, as in many other
areas of demographic inquiry, historical studies with adequate data and suitable
models can give us some idea of the multigenerational implications of changes in the
socioeconomic characteristics of parents. To my knowledge, this style of research
has not incorporated individual- or family-level multigenerational effects of the sort
discussed in the earlier parts of this essay, whether in social mobility or in basic
demographic processes. This will be an important future step.
Multigenerational Studies of Social Mobility
I have cited a number of studies that provide suggestive evidence for grandparent
effects on a variety of outcomes, typically for children in the third generation. The
arguments in this essay imply that more of these types of investigations will be
fruitful. In addition to these studies, it will be desirable to revisit studies of
intergenerational socioeconomic mobility—along the dimensions of income,
educational attainment, occupational status, and wealth—to determine the conditions
under which departures from Markovian patterns of intergenerational mobility come
about and how different fertility, mortality, and other demographic processes
contribute to intergenerational effects. Two closely related lines of inquiry are
needed: studies of the net (“causal”) effects of grandparents on their adult
grandchildren and more descriptive studies that investigate whether intergenerational
associations of socioeconomic distributions are consistent with the Markovian
assumption. An example of the former type of study is Warren and Hauser’s( 1997)
analysis of occupational status attainment in three generations of Wisconsinites.
Although this study revealed no net effects of grandparents’ occupational statuses on
those of grandchildren, mid-twentieth century Wisconsin families may be a
population in which multigenerational effects are unusually weak. Thus, where data
are available, we should carry out similar studies in a variety of times, places, and
institutional circumstances. Potentially fruitful contexts for this research include
South Africa, China, and central Europe, societies that underwent massive social
transformations during the middle and late twentieth century and for which sample
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hardship and segregation of blacks in South Africa, both during and in the aftermath
of apartheid, may be a source of longer-run multigenerational continuity at the
bottom of the socioeconomic distribution than would be expected on the basis of
Markovian inheritance. The pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet eras in central
Europe potentially created circumstances in which, for some birth cohorts,
individuals’ socioeconomic achievements may depend more on grandparents than
parents. Although the disruptive effects of socialist revolution on patterns of
parent-to-offspring socioeconomic mobility in some of these societies have been
documented, the potential effects of grandparents who lived primarily in the
pre-Soviet era on grandchildren who came of age in the post-Soviet era require more
research. Similarly, China, which has undergone massive transformations since the
middle of the twentieth century, may exhibit substantial changes in intergenerational
and multigenerational effects. Treiman and colleagues have gathered data for each of
these societies on multiple generations of educational and occupational attainment,
relying on the retrospective reports of members of the third generation (Szelenyi and
Treiman 1994; Treiman et al. 1996; Treiman and Walder 1998).
Although such studies will be useful, they should also be extended in a variety of
ways. First, they should be supplemented by demographic data and models so that
intergenerationaleffectsareproperlyweightedbythedifferentialfertilityandsurvivalof
each generation (e.g., Mare and Maralani 2006). As discussed earlier, the effect of a
change in the characteristics of a parent or grandparent is not only the simple
regression-based estimate of the net association with offspring’s characteristics but
also the demographic effect of differential reproduction.
Second, these multigenerational studies should be supplemented with studies based
on better data. Although the retrospective surveys are unique and underexploited data
sources, they potentially suffer from survivor and recall biases. The grandparent
generation can be recalled only when they have both children and grandchildren. For
analyses of the determinants of outcomes in the grandchild generation, this may be
satisfactory provided that it is possible to ignore recall errors and ignorance of
grandchildren about the socioeconomic characteristics of grandparents. But from the
standpoint of the socioeconomic reproductivity of the grandparents’ cohorts, it is
necessary to know about the fertility and survival of those cohorts, including persons
who were childless. Survival and recall problems are less serious with prospective and
archival sources. Although high-quality prospective data are not available for societies
that have undergone radical transformations in the past half-century, they are
increasingly available for a variety of other periods and countries. The best of these
data obtain rich information on social mobility, demographic processes, and other
characteristics and behaviors. In the United States, the PSID and Health and Retirement
Study are the best ongoing data collection projects of this kind, and they are being used
astemplates for the study of intergenerationalrelations inmany other countries. Related
studies in less-developed nations, such as the Indonesian and Mexican Family Life
Surveys, will also be valuable for this purpose provided that their panels are sustained.
Third, it will be necessary to consider more than just three generations. For this
purpose it will almost certainly be necessary to go beyond survey data and to rely
instead on ambitious archival and reconstruction efforts that permit a detailed
examination of family lineages over many generations. An outstanding example of
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lineage data based on public registries for northeastern China from the eighteenth to
the twentieth century (Lee et al. 2010). The data permit rich connections among kin
across multiple generations and can be used to study multigenerational effects on
both demographic and socioeconomic outcomes (Campbell and Lee 2008). The data
are prospective, meaning that lineages can be traced forward as they grow or become
extinct, making it possible to study socioeconomic and demographic reproductivity
in tandem.
Finally, it will be necessary to attend to the identification of “grandparent” or
“lineage effects,” when we almost always face the competing hypothesis of
unmeasured characteristics of parents. One may be tempted to define away
grandparent effects by characterizing them as just another set of parental
characteristics. This is satisfactory in practice only if we are truly confident that
the scope and characteristics of relevant ancestors are known and simple enough
that they can be reduced to a small number of variables and that ancestral effects
are limited to two generations. More complex and distant ancestry effects may
not, in practice, be reducible to parent effects. Even in simple cases, moreover,
one has to measure the relevant ancestral characteristics; relying on parents alone
is insufficient. The general issue is one of distinguishing “unmeasured
heterogeneity” from “state dependence” (e.g., Bartholomew 1982; Heckman
1981;H s i a o2003). Armed with enough generations of observations and
reasonably tight arguments about the presence or absence of institutional,
biological, and demographic support for multigenerational effects, their presence
or absence can be rigorously adjudicated.
A second type of study of multigenerational processes focuses on whether
patterns of intergenerational socioeconomic mobility—whether for income, wealth,
occupation, or educational attainment—follow the Markovian assumption. Such
studies are concerned with describing mobility patterns rather than with determining
whether grandparent characteristics are causes of grandchild outcomes. A simple
version of this type of study was provided by Hodge (1966) in the study discussed
previously. Hodge compared the observed intergenerational mobility rates from
grandfathers to grandsons with those that would be implied by the two sets of
intergenerational rates, from grandfathers to fathers and from fathers to sons. The
size and pattern of discrepancies between the observed and implied rates of mobility
provide evidence for and against the Markovian assumption.
So far as data permit, modified versions of this approach should be replicated and
extended to a variety of populations. As Hodge himself pointed out, his study ignored
differential fertility levels and timing, which should be incorporated into the mobility
tables(e.g.,Mare1997). Additionally, investigators should consider the possibility that
mobility rates are heterogeneous. Although this is an obvious observation when we
think of variation among observable groups defined by gender, ethnicity, region, and
so on, heterogeneous mobility processes may also arise from mixtures of unobserved
or partially observed processes. For example, some families may follow a Markov
process in that grandparents’ and grandchildren’s socioeconomic positions are
conditionally independent given the positions of parents, whereas other families
may follow a more complex process in which grandparents’ and grandchildren’s
positions are associated even after parents’ positions are taken into account. This
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governed by a complex set of cultural, economic, and other forces that are only
partially observed by the analyst. The task for researchers is both to identify these
sources of heterogeneity using direct measures of the institutional forces of
multigenerational effects (such as those proposed in this essay) and to develop
statistical models for representing these mixtures in mobility data.
Finally, it is necessary to address the difficulty of determining whether
intergenerational mobility data follow a Markov process or a more complex process.
If patterns of intergenerational mobility are constant over time, it is relatively
straightforward to discriminate between Markovian and non-Markovian patterns in
mobility tables for three or more generations. However, if the mobility process is
changing, apparent net associations between the characteristics of grandparents and
grandchildren may be artifacts of changes in mobility patterns. In the latter case,
grandparents’ characteristics may appear to be associated with those of their
grandchildren when, in fact, there is no net association. Rather, two-generation
associations, albeit in a form that changes across the generations, may suffice to describe
intergenerational mobility patterns. Successful resolution of this identification issue may
require data on more than three generations. It may also require careful substantive
reasoning about which aspects of intergenerational mobility may be time invariant.
Descriptive Statistics
In addition to the need for more and better data and models, we should also think
about describing different phenomena than we usually do. We are all members of
surviving multigenerational lines. Yet, as illustrated by archival data such as those of
Campbell and Lee (Lee et al. 2010), many other lines have not been so fortunate.
Our descriptions of patterns of social mobility and inequality are almost always
confined to survivors. A more rigorous approach to the multigenerational study of
inequality is to describe the joint processes of reproductivity and socioeconomic
prosperity and hardship. The success of a lineage is a moving average of the
socioeconomic well-being and health of its members, either in total or on a per capita
basis. The likelihood that this well-being outlives individuals (and leaves lineages
well-off or faring poorly) depends on whether it takes the form of durable physical
or financial capital or of perishable human capital. As tough as the data requirements
are, we need something analogous to individual or family permanent income
measures of wealth, income, occupation, and human capital for lineages. The
distribution of these measures of success will dictate inequality among lineages.
Both the total and the per capita calculations depend on fertility and mortality, and
these, of course, depend on socioeconomic conditions. In short, to view inequality in
a multigenerational perspective, not only do we need data and models, but we also
need to describe new phenomena.
Conclusion
We ignore the effects of ancestors and higher-order social contacts at the peril of
sound demographic research. It is likely that we have overstated intergenerational
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the pathways through which it occurs. Our models of social mobility have a
strong mid-twentieth century American middle- and working-class bias. That is,
they emphasize the pivotal role of formal schooling in transmitting the
advantages conferred by parents on offspring and inducing new variation in the
socioeconomic positions of the next generation that is independent of those of
the previous generation (Blau and Duncan 1967). This is understandable given
the overwhelming dominance of these types of families in our best nationally
representative sources of data and the healthy aversion of demographically
trained social scientists toward drawing broad conclusions from observations of
elite or marginal populations. Yet such an orientation limits our ability to see
other types of intergenerational mobility and immobility patterns that may
dominate the highest and lowest segments of social hierarchies and to envision
that the relative sizes of elite and underclass populations may change over time.
We should be open to pluralistic models of mobility that regard populations as
containing mixtures of two-generational and multigenerational modes of
socioeconomic persistence.
A corollary of this conclusion is that the “correct” family configurations for
the study of social mobility may vary across time and place. In some times and
places, father-to-offspring associations may summarize adequately how families
pass their advantages and disadvantages on to the next generation. In others,
mothers may be a key part of the process as well. In still others, nonresident kin
or earlier ancestors may have large effects on new generations of children.
Population heterogeneity in these modes of intergenerational mobility is always a
possibility. Finally, social mobility is as much about family creation and
destruction as it is about associations between the characteristics of key kin in
each generation. The “effects” of family background are almost always
mechanisms through which some parts of the population grow faster than others,
and social mobility itself is just one part of the picture. We need to study
biological and socioeconomic reproduction in tandem.
Many of the pioneering researchers in this area came of professional age
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when mortality was low and falling,
fertility was fluctuating, immigration was modest, most households had two
parents with a well-defined division of labor, and inequality was stable (and
much lower than today). The social science that emerged at that time was
remarkably good and deservedly influential, but in some ways it reflected the
ethos and concerns of the middle class at that time. Times have changed, our
resources have matured, and our capacities to see further into the past, around
the globe, and to the extremes of the distributions that we study have grown. In
due course, a more multigenerational perspective on inequality will seem a
natural way to look at things.
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